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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE

~I.

WHITELEY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
JOHN DeVRIES, BARBARA De\TRIES, HARRY L. BARNUM,
STREVEL.L-PATERSON
FINANCE CORPORATION

Case No.

7314

D·ef endan.ts.

M. L. EWELL, doing business as
Ewell Plumbing and Heating,
Defendamt and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with most of what is stated as
the facts of this matter by ap·pellant in his brief. However, there are certain matters which should be clarified.
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On the lOth of March, 1947, respondent loaned $4,000.00 to John DeVries and Barbara DeVries on a
promissory note secured by mortgage, said loan to bear
interest at the rate of 6!% per annum and payable at
the rate of $50.00 per month; thereafter, on April 16,
1947, respondent loaned to DeVries $1,000.00 on a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the said premises.
The original loans were made to enable the DeVries to
build a tourist court on their property at 4214 :South
State Street. Construction was commenced. Among
those working on the property was one M. L. Ewell,
the appellant, who did the plumbing work. He commenced working on the premises about the 1st of July,
1947 and finished his work on August 15, 1947. After
he had agreed to do the plumbing work on the tourist
motel and had commenced work, it became necessary
for DeVries to get additional financing. Therefore, on
July 31st, DeVries borrowed an additional $600.00 from
respondent. To secure said loan DeVries gave respondent a warranty deed (Tr. 124, 125, 126). It was to be
repaid in sixty days. The $600.00 was paid to appellant
and thereafter appellant finished the plumbing work
he had undertaken.
The answer and counterclaim of appellant deny the
execution of the mortgages, admit the recording of
them, and deny generally, for lack of information, the
allegations of plaintiff's complaint. However, there was
no controversy over the execution of the mortgages or
the warranty deed. The only issue made by the pleadings over which there was any controversy was whether
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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or not the receipt by respondent of the \varranty deed,
the subject of his third cause of action, caused a merger
of his t\vo mortgages, effectively destroying the prior
clai1ns against the property.
'The appellant alleges in paragraph 2 of the affirmative defense portion of his ans\ver, "That at the instance and request of the defendants John De V 11ies arnd
Barbara De V ri.es defendant performed labor and furnished materials on the property described in said complaint * * *"
The fifth paragraph of said answer sets up the
theory upon \vhich this case was tried before the trial
court~ said paragraph 5 reading as follows (Tr. 28):
'' 5. That by reason of the relinquishment of
said mortgage by reason of the warranty deed
set out above the lien of this defendant is prior
and paramount to the mortgaged indebtedness
alleged in plaintiff's First Cause Of Action."
There are no pleadings which make an issue of the
fact of appellant's reliance on respondent.
The court's decree sets down the priority of the
claims of respondent and appellant. The sheriff's costs
\Vere given first priority; respondent's $4,000.00 mortgage, the interest thereon and attorneys' fees applying
thereto, were placed second; his $1,000.00 mortgage, the
interest thereon and the attorneys' fees applicable thereto, were. placed third, then the court decreed that if
there were any proceeds remaining the sheriff should
deposit in court the sum of $1, 514.75, together with inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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terest thereon from the 1st day of July, 1947, said
amount being the claimed debt for which appellant had
a mechanic's lien.
The loan which was secured by the warranty deed
was given fifth place in priority by the court's decree.
The theory of defense made by the pleadings was
that the receipt by respondent of the warranty deed
merged all of his interest in the DeVries' property and
therefore the mechanic's lien, which was filed by appellant on October 3, 1947, taking priority as of July 1,
1947, came ahead of respondent's mortgage of March
lOth and his mortgage of April 15, 1947. It was only
after the finding of the court that said warranty deed
did not merge the two prior mortgages that appellant
advanced his theory of reliance upon respondent as the
party responsible for all the building on the motel at
4214 South State Street.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NEITHER THE PLEADINGS NOR THE EVIDENCE
MAKE ANY ISSUE ON APPELLANT'S RELIANCE UPON
RESPONDENT AS HIS DEBTOR.

POINT II.
APPELLANT MAY NOT SEEK REVIEW O·N A DEFENSE NOT PRESENT'ED BY THE PLEADINGS OR EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL COURT.

POINT III.
THE DECREE OF THE COURT IS SUPPO·RTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL AND UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE.
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ARGUI\IENT
POIN'T I .
. NEITHER THE PLEADINGS NOR THE EVIDENCE
1\IAKE ANY ISSUE ON APPELLANT'S RELIANCE UPON
RESPONDENT AS HIS DEBTOR.

Appellant's argument under his first subheading is
based completely upon his reliance theory. The cases
'vhich he cites in support of said argument are all cases
"\vhere the mortgagees have, by their conduct, caused a
mechanic or other person doing work on mortgaged
premises to believe that the mortgagee was the owner
and responsible person to whom they could look for the
payment of any obligation against the premises. In the
case at bar no such facts exist. Appellant's answer is
completely inconsistent with any such theory. It states
specifically that the services and materials furnished
by appellant were furnished at the "instance and request of the defendants John DeVries and Barbara
DeVries.''
The work which appellant did was contracted and
commenced pTior to the date of the $600.00 loan. The
record is clear that Ewell did not even know who appellant was at the time he contracted to do the plumbing
work for DeVries (Tr. 116, 117). It is also clear that
respondent, Whiteley, did not know who Ewell was (Tr.
126). The only persons Ewell ever saw were DeVries
and Gaddis. Gaddis was the agent of Whiteley but for
a very limited purpose, to loan Whiteley's money and,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at the same time he was the agent of DeVries in securing
a loan for him. There is no evidence whatsoever of any
authority on the part of Gaddis to -contract with mechanies or workmen for work on property owned by DeVries.
Ewell frankly stated that he dealt only with DeVries
and the money which he received was from D,eVries.
All of the parties involved, Whiteley, Ewell, Gaddis
and DeVries looked upon and considered DeVries to be
the owner of the motel when the loan of $600.00 was
made. DeVries exercised the control of the details of
the work and construction and acted at all times as the
owner.

POIN'T II.
APPELLANT MAY NOT SEEK REVIEW ON A DEFENSE NOT PRESENTED BY THE PLEADINGS OR EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL COURT.

The defense which appellant asserts on appea1
seems to be that he relied on respondent, Whiteley, in
doing his work. That defense was not pleaded and no
issue on it ever made in the trial court.
The law of this state. is that if there is any reason
why defendant should prevail it is his duty to plead it
as a defense. Not having done so he cannot complain on
appeal.Mills v. Gr1ay, 50 Utah 224, 167 P. 358; Chipmarn
v. Ame.rica;n F1ork City, 54 Utah ·93, 179 P. 742.
The cases are numerous that the type of defense
which appellant now asserts must be pleaded and relied
upon in his action in the trial court before he can raise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the matter in the appellate court. See Dolimsky v. Willl~a.n1s, 56 Utah 186, 189 P. 873.
It would be a strange situation if an appellant was
allo,ved to urge upon this court a defense and theory
\Yhich he did not plead and which was inconsistent with
the allegations of his complaint. To allow it would give
such an appellant an unconscionable advantage over
both respondent and the trial court. Fisher v. Bank of
Spa.nish F~oTk, 93 Utah 514, 74 P. (2d) 659; Ob·radovich
v. Walker Bros. Bank, 86 Utah 587, 16 P. (2d) 212.

POINT III.
THE DECREE OF THE COURT IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL AND UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE.

Under Point II, appellant argues that the trial
court erred in not sustaining defendant's objections and
motion to strike the testimony of witness Gaddis. Appellant quotes only a part of the testimony concerning
the nature of the warranty deed. Gaddis, after the
testimony to which appellant objected, testified fully
concerning what he remembered of the transaction involving the warranty deed. During the cross-examination the following pertinent information was elicited

('Tr. 96) :

"Q You were the agent of Mr. Whiteley, is
that

right~

"A Yes.
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"Q For the purpose of negotiating this
loan~

''A Mr. Whi te1ey was going to lend six
hundred dollars to mortgage on the property.

"Q · What did he

say~

''A He would lend six hundred dollars provided they would give him a Vvarrenty Deed to
the property instead of a third mortgage.''
And at a still later time the following question and
answer was elicited by appellant's -counsel (Tr. 100,101):

"Q What did you say to Mr.
"A What did I -say to
"Q y es.

~1r.

DeVries~

DeVries~

"A I said, 'Mr. Whiteley demands a Warranty Deed to the property if he gives you this
third loan of six hundred dollars.' He wants
this Warranty Deed to the property, which DeVries and his wife agreed to.''
And then on redirect examination the following interchange occurred ( Tr. 103) :

"Q You were the agent for Mr. Whiteley
and what did you understand this instrument to
be~"

*

:t

* * *

''A Security for the six hundred dollar
loan.''

In the review by this court of an equity case wherein
the judge sat without a jury, the court will 'P~resume
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

that the trial court disregarded incompetent, immaterial
or valueless evidence. The court in effect gives a trial
de novo on the record made in the trial court. In this
trial de novo the judgment will be reversed only if
after excluding improper evidence, the judgm·ent of
the trial court does not then have support in the evidence. Federal Land Bank of Berkley v. Salt Lake Valley Sa;nd & Gra.v:el Co., 96 Utah 359, 85 P. (2d) 791;
Lipscomb v. Exchange Nation1al Bank of Spokarne, 80
Wash. 296, 141 P. 686.
Whiteley himself testified clearly and succinctly
concerning the nature of the transaction. The record is
replete ·w·ith statements to the effect that the taking of
this warrenty deed was merely to secure an additional
loan of $600.00 and that it was not intended by either
the De Vries or respondent to merge and destroy the
rights which respondent had under his two earlier mortgages.
The law of this state is clear that where a mortgage
incumbrancer becomes the owner of the legal title J
the equity of redemption, a merger will not be held to
take place, if it be app-arent that it was not the intention
of the mortgagee, or if, in the absence of any intention,
-the merger would be against his manifest interest.
Ch(J;U.Sse v. B:ank of Garlwnd, 71 Utah 586, 268 P. 781;
O'Reilly v. McLeam, 84 Utah 551, 37 P. (2d) 770.
Under the facts of the present case the manifest
interest of respondent Whiteley are against merger, it
being abundantly clear that if merger occurred the priSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ority date of Whiteley's interest would be July 31,
1948. Not only would Ewell's mechanic's lien come
ahead of the two mortgages which respondent had upon
the premises, but the mechanic's lien of one Harry L.
Barnum would be prior. Whiteley specifically stated
his intentions (Tr. 125, 12.6) :

''A W eli, he said to me-l am taking both
parts-Mr. DeVries told me this condition that
I am repeating, that the plu1nber \vouldn't go
any further until he had $600 more, and, if he
had $600 more, he could get opened, and that we
-if I would let him have another $600, he'd get
open there in sixty days; he would return the
$600 to me, and that, for this $600, he would give
me a deed to the property for sixty days, guaranteeing to pick up the $600 that I was to let him
have within sixty days, and that's how this-

" Q That instrument then that he gave
you'' A This is what was given me for the security for my $600.
''Q Now, did Mr. DeVries or his wife ever
pick this deed up or pay you the $600~
''A Never did, no.

'' Q Never received any money on account
of this loan of $600 ~
"A I received a $50 interest payment.
'That is all you have ever received~
"A That is all I have ever received.
'' Q This proposition, this security arrangemen, was Mr. DeVries' suggestions, was it, Mr.
Whiteley, as you have related here~
'' Q
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''A No, I think that was Mr. Gaddis' idea
to take-he said, 'We'll take a deed to this property from you if Mr. Whiteley will let you have
the $600, and at the end of sixty days, if you pick
up the $600, you can have the deed back and then
the t":o first and second mortgages will ride.'''
In view of the testimony both the Chau.sse and O'Reilly
Cases are controlling and no merger occurred.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the lower court's judgment that
the liens created by respondent's two mortgages did
not merge with the warranty deed is correct and therefore the decree of the court awarding respondent priority as to his first two mortgages over ap·pellant's lien
is a correct and lawful judgment.
Respectfully subm/i)tt ed,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
BLACK & RO·BERTS,
Dwight L. King
.Attorneys fO!r Respo%den"b
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